MEASURING THE DEGREE OF MARKET POWER AMONG BEEF EXPORTERS TO JAPAN by Saghaian, Sayed H. & Reed, Michael R.
Measuring the Degree of Market Power among Beef Exporters to Japan  
 
 
 
 
 
Sayed H. Saghaian and Michael R. Reed 
 
Sayed H. Saghaian is Lecturer in Agricultural Economics, Faculty of Agriculture, Food and 
Natural Resources, University of Sydney, Sydney, Australia and Michael R. Reed is professor, 
Department of Agricultural Economics, University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY. 
 
Contact info: shsagh2@uky.edu 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Selected Paper prepared for presentation at the Southern Agricultural Economics Association Annual Meetings 
Tulsa, Oklahoma, February 18, 2004  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright 2004 by Sayed H. Saghaian and Michael R. Reed.  All rights reserved.  Readers may make verbatim 
copies of this document for non-commercial purposes by any means, provided that this copyright notice appears on 
all such copies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   2
Measuring the Degree of Market Power among Beef Exporters to Japan  
 
Abstract: A residual-demand model for beef exporters to Japan is specified to estimate market 
power. The analysis is disaggregated by beef cut and form. The results indicate U.S. frozen-ribs 
category enjoys the highest markup of price over marginal cost, while Australia and New 
Zealand have some market power, which includes five chilled-beef categories.  
 
 Introduction 
Japan is the largest beef importing country in the world in terms of value and second (behind the 
U.S.) in terms of volume. In fiscal year 1999, they imported 683 thousand metric tons of beef, 
slightly more than they imported in fiscal 1998 (Table 1). In 1999, Japan accounted for 13% of 
world beef import volume and 17% of world beef import value (United Nations). Japanese beef 
imports grew rapidly through 1995, but since that time they have shown little growth. Japan’s 
continuing financial problems and slow economic growth have affected beef imports. 
  Nowhere in the world is the quality spectrum (where quality is measured by the degree of 
marbling) larger than in Japan’s beef market, from low-quality grass fed beef to highly marbled 
Japanese wagyu beef (Hayes and Longworth). The U.S. Meat Export Federation estimates that 
U.S. choice beef falls about midway in the quality spectrum for the Japanese market.  Japanese 
consumers are very discriminating in their consumption patterns for beef and beef origin is very 
important to them.  There is a clear preference for domestic beef and Japanese consumers prefer 
and are willing to pay higher prices for chilled beef products (Kerr et al.; Hayes; and Erikson et 
al.). 
  Table 1 shows that Japan is an important beef market for Australia and the U.S., 
accounting for over 300 thousand tons of exports for each country. Australia and the U.S. have 
traditionally split the Japanese beef import market, each accounting for slightly less than 50% of 
the volume. In the early 1990s Australia had a larger market share than the U.S., but the U.S. 
overtook Australia in 1996 and has been the leading supplier since. In fiscal year 1999, the U.S.   3
held a market share of 48.6% versus 46.0% for Australia (Table 2). These shares vary, though, 
depending on the form of imports (whether they are chilled or frozen). Australia leads in 
exportation of chilled beef, while the U.S. leads in exportation of frozen beef. Canada and New 
Zealand are more important players in the Japanese beef market for frozen products.  
  The variety and uniqueness of Japanese cooking styles and the relatively high price of 
beef make the market very dynamic with regard to the distribution of beef cuts imported. 
Japanese beef imports are almost exclusively in the form of boneless cuts. Carcasses and bone-in 
cuts account for less than two percent of imports currently. Chilled beef imports for fiscal year 
1998 were 56% chuck, clod and round, 20% loins, and 23% ribs (ALIC). Frozen beef imports for 
fiscal year 1998 were 17% chuck, clod and round, 7% loins, 48% ribs, and 28% other cuts. In 
recent years, there has been a move toward chilled chucks and rounds away from loins due to 
stagnant incomes in Japan and continued high prices for imported beef. Table 3 shows Japanese 
imports of boneless cuts from the four major beef exporting countries for September 1999 
through August 2000. Chilled chucks, clods, and rounds account for the most volume, frozen 
ribs are second, and chilled ribs are third. The U.S. is the leading supplier of each frozen cut, 
while Australia is the leading supplier of chilled chucks, clods, rounds, and loins. 
  Despite this rich diversity and intensity of competition among beef cuts, there has been 
no analytical research which examines this facet of Japanese import patterns. Further, no 
analytical study has distinguished between chilled and frozen imports. This study investigates 
the intensity of competitive relationships among beef import suppliers in the Japanese market 
using data by beef cut and form (chilled versus frozen). Because of the exacting requirements 
and differentiated nature of beef products in Japan, exporters could have market power. A 
residual demand model by country for the main four competitors, Australia, the U.S., Canada,   4
and New Zealand, is specified and estimated. The objective is to estimate the residual demand 
elasticity that each exporter faces in Japan. The residual demand elasticities will indicate the 
extent of market power that beef exporters have in the Japanese beef market. The analysis is 
disaggregated by beef cut, so that the competitive relationships can vary by beef market segment. 
The results are used to provide insights into pricing and marketing behavior of major beef 
exporters competing in Japan. 
 
Conceptual Framework 
In an imperfectly competitive market, the extent of competition is expressed as the relative 
markup of price over marginal cost, or the Lerner index. Many studies have attempted to 
investigate and measure the index of market power in domestic and international markets 
(Krugman, Baker and Bresnahan, Knetter 1989 and 1993, Barnett et al., Goldberg and Knetter 
1997 and 1999, Gil-Pareja, and Glauben and Loy, among others). In practice, it is usually very 
difficult to calculate the index directly because marginal costs are unknown and the lack of 
appropriate data hampers the investigation. Goldberg and Knetter (1999) indicate that the use of 
accounting data as a measure of marginal costs could lead to a seriously biased measure of 
market power. In antitrust cases, the standard method used to prove market power hinges on the 
size of the firm’s market share: the higher the market share, the higher the degree of monopoly 
power, ceteris paribus. However, a significant market share can also correspond to a situation 
where price equals marginal cost (total lack of market power) if the demand elasticity tends to 
infinity, or a situation where a firm with a small market share applies a significant markup over 
marginal cost through product differentiation. In the context of international markets, data 
problems are even more serious because exporters face different competitors and different   5
demand conditions in destination markets. 
  Bresnahan surveys models of market power estimation that do not need direct estimation 
of marginal costs. These models are known as models of new empirical industrial organization 
(NEIO). One of these methods exploits the relationship between market power and the inverse 
elasticity of residual demand faced by a firm (Baker and Bresnahan). The residual demand 
elasticity represents the relationship between a firm’s price and quantity, taking into 
consideration the supply of other producers in the market, and this elasticity is considered a 
measure of market power. In the case of perfect competition where there is no market power, a 
firm’s supply changes will have no effect on the price and the residual demand is perfectly 
elastic. In case of market power the elasticity is nonzero, and the steeper the residual demand 
curve the more market power exists.            
  Specifically, consider exporter i selling a product in a destination market. This exporter’s 
inverse residual demand depends on the quantities it exports, i Q , the exports of competitors,  j Q  
for  j i ≠ , and a vector of destination market demand shifters, Z. The profit maximization 
problem for exporter i can be written as: 
 (1)  Maximize  ) , ( ) , , ( i i i i i j i i i W Q C e Q Z Q Q P − = π  
where  i P  is the destination market price of product i,  i e  is the bilateral exchange rate between 
the destination market and exporter’s currency, and  i C  represents exporter i’s costs. Assuming 
that  i π  satisfies sufficient conditions for differentiability, the first order condition for profit 
maximization is to set the expected marginal revenue equal to marginal cost, or: 
(2) . , 0 )] / )( / ( / [ j i MC e Q Q Q P Q P Q P i i i j j i i i i i ≠ ∀ = − ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂ +  
Here the terms in the bracket represent the conduct parameters of exporter i faced with other 
competitors and the strategic interactions of the exporters in the market. In the case of perfect   6
competition, the terms in the bracket are zero and price equals marginal cost in the market. The 
estimation of a simultaneous system made up of the above inverse demand relationships and the 
corresponding first order conditions provide a measure of market power as well as complete 
information about own and cross price elasticities and conduct (Bresnahan).  
A method developed by Goldberg and Knetter (1999) manipulates the above 
simultaneous system to obtain only one equation for estimation of the exporter’s residual 
demand, which is a reduced form version of the above structural model. The exporter’s market 
power is captured through the elasticity of this residual demand equation. The variables in this 
inverse residual demand include quantity exported, a vector of demand determinants in the 
destination market, and competitors’ cost shifters. The clear advantage of this method is that it 
requires far less detailed data, which are generally lacking in domestic and international markets, 
in order to estimate a measure of market power. 
The explicit expression of the inverse residual demand function developed by Goldberg 
and Knetter (1999) for an exporter is: 
(3)  mt
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where m denotes a specific destination market and N denotes the number of competitors an 
exporter faces in that market. In this specification, export unit prices and demand shifters are 
expressed in units of the destination currency. The equations are expressed in double-log form so 
that the coefficients are interpreted as elasticities and the error term is assumed to be independent 
and identically distributed. Since the quantity exported is simultaneously determined along with 
the export price, it is endogenous and needs to be instrumented.  Tests for endogeneity should be 
conducted. An exporter’s supply shifters and the bilateral exchange rate between the exporting 
country and the destination market are natural instruments.    7
The coefficient on quantity exported represents the inverse of the residual demand 
elasticity, which is the main point of interest here. If it is estimated to be zero, it indicates 
competitive behavior and a lack of market power. If it is statistically significant, it means there is 
market power and a larger value is an indication of relatively more market power over price.  
Baker and Bresnahan and Goldberg and Knetter (1999) argue that in some cases this residual 
demand elasticity coincides with the measure of markup over marginal costs, known as the 
Lerner index. Those cases are the Stackelberg leader, the dominant firm model with a 
competitive fringe, and the case in which extensive product differentiation is present.  
The latter case is of special interest in this research because imported beef is 
differentiated in Japan and the quality and retail prices of beef by country of origin vary widely 
in the Japanese beef market (Longworth). Survey results have also shown that Japanese 
consumers have strong preferences for quality in beef and can readily identify different qualities 
of beef in the market (Khan, Ramaswami, and Sapp). Goldberg and Knetter (1999) argue that: 
“in the case of product differentiation, the distinction between conjectural variations and reaction 
functions becomes less relevant as the substitutability between the products of competing firms 
diminishes. Intuitively, if a firm has market power because its products are distinct from the 
products of other firms, the role of strategic interaction is less important” (p. 39). 
 
Empirical Model and Data   
For this research, it is assumed that each exporting country faces a residual demand curve that is 
downward sloping, reflecting the market demand minus the supplies of competitors. The country 
can maximize profit from that residual demand curve through its output decisions
1. Beef is 
assumed to be differentiated by country of origin. For instance, Australian beef is differentiated   8
from U.S. beef. Also, the beef market is segmented by beef types (chuck, loin, and ribs) and each 
cut is separately analyzed on a chilled and frozen basis. The choice of beef cuts in this research 
is strictly determined by data availability.  The beef type chuck includes chuck, clod, and round.   
In this specification, the demand shifters include a time trend, real disposable income, 
and the price level in the destination market. The competitors’ cost shifters usually include 
typical input prices such as wages and prices of raw materials. However, Goldberg and Knetter 
(1999) suggest that detailed costs shifters of competitors are not necessary in the international 
setting and bilateral exchange rates can be used as ideal cost shifters because exchange rate 
variations shift the costs of exporters in the destination market. Hence, in the case of the four 
main beef exporters to Japan, four equations are specified and estimated separately for each of 
the three beef types in chilled and frozen forms as follows: 
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where t and k index time and beef type, respectively, i and j index countries, T denotes time 
trend, e is the bilateral exchange rate, and DY stands for Japanese nominal disposable income. 
The endogenous variables are the unit export prices in the destination market currency, yen per 
kilogram.   
  The model is fitted using monthly data from February 1992 to August 2000. Monthly 
data allows for higher frequency and more observations to investigate the relationships existing 
among the variables in the model. The data are disaggregated by beef cut to capture the 
differences in the market segments. Data on Japanese prices and imports by cut came from the 
Agriculture and Livestock Industries Corporation (ALIC). Exchange rates came from the 
International Monetary Fund. Japanese personal consumption expenditures were used as the 
measure of income. Expenditure data were chosen because they were readily available on a   9
quarterly basis. These quarterly data were divided by three to obtain monthly estimates. 
Expenditure data came from the Economic Planning Agency of Japan. 
 
Estimation Results 
Equation (4) is estimated for each beef type separately; we have treated the four country 
equations of each beef type as a separate simultaneous system using the Iterative Seemingly 
Unrelated Regression. Hence, there is a simultaneous system for each beef type (chuck, loin, and 
ribs) and form (fresh and frozen). Each simultaneous system has four equations, one for each of 
the four competitors in the Japanese beef market: the U.S., Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. 
Overall, there are 24 equations, one for each beef type for each country and, accordingly, 24 
residual (inverse) demand elasticities. The time series nature of the data set suggests that auto-
correlation could be a problem. We tested for autocorrelation and performed the appropriate 
transformations when the tests indicated its presence. One should remember that if the market is 
perfectly competitive, the residual demand elasticities will equal zero; otherwise the market is 
imperfectly competitive. Table 4 summarizes the estimation results for the residual inverse 
demand elasticities.  
In over one half of the cases (13 of 24), the elasticity estimates were significantly 
different from zero, showing some degree of imperfect competition. All the statistically 
significant residual inverse demand elasticities had the expected negative sign, indicating that the 
exporting countries face a negatively sloped residual demand curve.  
 
U.S. exports of chilled and frozen chuck, loin, and ribs:  
The estimated residual inverse demand elasticity of U.S. frozen ribs, which is significantly   10
different from zero at the one-percent level, approximates the markup of price over marginal cost 
or Lerner index. Its estimated value in absolute term is 3.1 (=1/0.3223) and it is the sole demand 
elasticity that is statistically significant among the six U.S. beef types exported to Japan. This 
implies that though the U.S. has a significant market share in the Japanese beef market, the 
conjecture of competitive behavior can only be rejected in the frozen ribs market. U.S. exporters 
behave competitively and do not apply any market power in their sales of chilled beef (chuck, 
loin, and ribs) and frozen chuck and loin in our sample.  
The estimated elasticity for U.S. frozen ribs is relatively elastic, and its value indicates 
that the U.S. market power for frozen ribs is the largest among all beef-types exported to Japan. 
Frozen ribs are used in the “beef bowl” restaurants, which are sometimes labeled as Japanese fast 
food, and U.S. frozen ribs dominate as the raw ingredient for this market.  This relatively high 
residual demand elasticity for U.S. frozen ribs is plausible and consistent with the high Japanese 
consumer demand and the rapidly expanding market for this product.  
Despite having a significant market share with some other beef types, the U.S. does not 
have significant market power. These results are likely because most of the U.S. beef cuts that 
are exported to Japan are not used extensively in the U.S. In fact, correspondence with the U.S. 
Meat Export Federation reveals that most of these beef cuts would be trim (used as ground beef) 
if they remained in the U.S. In that sense, the Japanese buyers do a big favor to U.S. packers by 
taking what would otherwise be low-value cuts in the U.S., and marketing them as higher-valued 
cuts in Japan. Hence it is reasonable that U.S. packers would not apply market power when it 
comes to such products. 
Frozen ribs might be an exception because the “beef bowl” restaurants are so popular in 
Japan. Japanese buyers must bid away some rib cuts from the U.S. market so that their desire for   11
these meal types are satisfied. This gives the U.S. sellers some degree of market power and 
allows them to sell above marginal costs. 
 
Australian exports of chilled and frozen chuck, loin, and ribs:  
Australia, like the U.S., has a major market share in the Japanese beef market. The empirical 
results for the residual inverse demand elasticity of Australian beef exports to Japan indicate that 
the hypothesis that Australian exporters face a perfectly elastic residual demand is rejected in 
five of the six beef categories. The one estimated residual demand elasticity that is statistically 
insignificant is chilled chuck, indicating no markup over marginal cost. The estimated inverse 
demand elasticities that are significantly different from zero range from -0.09 for fresh and 
chilled ribs to -0.12 for fresh and chilled loin in our sample, indicating residual demand 
elasticities of 8 to 11 (=1/0.12 to 1/0.09) in absolute value. Hence, the residual demands for 
Australian beef categories are highly elastic and the markups are relatively small. 
The Japanese market is very important to the Australian beef industry, but the reverse is 
also true.  Despite being heavily reliant on the Japanese beef consumers, the Australians have 
been able to take advantage of their product’s relatively low price to extract some profits through 
their exportation for most cuts.   
 
Canadian exports of chilled and frozen chuck, loin, and ribs:   
The empirical results for Canadian exports show that estimated residual inverse demand 
elasticities are significantly different from zero for two beef categories, chilled loin and frozen 
ribs; and the estimated values are -0.1032 and -0.1710, respectively.  Given that Canada also 
exports grain-fed beef to Japan, one would expect their results to be similar to the U.S. This was   12
the case. Since the beef industry is smaller in Canada than in the U.S., it makes perfect sense that 
Canadian exporters might be able to sell above marginal costs for frozen ribs (as the U.S. did) 
and chilled loins too. Because Canada’s supplies are more limited, demand pressure from the 
Japanese can play a larger role in influencing Canada’s price for some cuts.   
 
New Zealand exports of chilled and frozen chuck, loin, and ribs:   
New Zealand, like Canada, has a small share of the Japanese beef import market, yet the 
estimated residual inverse demand elasticities of five beef categories are highly statistically 
different from zero, rejecting the hypothesis of perfect competition in our sample. The one beef 
type in which the hypothesis of perfectly competitive behavior cannot be rejected is for frozen 
loin. The estimated residual inverse demand elasticities range from -0.15 to -0.19 showing, in 
general, small application of market power with relatively elastic residual demands. Therefore, 
one can conclude that considering the residual inverse demand elasticity as a measure of markup 
over marginal cost, New Zealand beef exporters apply some market power in Japanese beef 
market, though their market share is small.   
 
Summary and Conclusions     
In this article, we investigate the intensity of competitive relationships among beef exporters in 
the Japanese market using disaggregated data by beef cut. The analysis is disaggregated by beef 
cut, so that the competitive relationships can capture the variation by beef market segment. 
Because of the exacting requirements and differentiated nature of beef products in Japan, 
exporters could have market power. A residual demand model for the main four competitors, 
Australia, the U.S., Canada, and New Zealand, is specified and estimated. The objective is to   13
estimate the residual demand elasticity that each exporter faces in Japan. The residual demand 
elasticities indicate the extent of market power beef exporters have in the Japanese beef market.  
Overall, the results of this analysis lend interesting insights into the competitive behavior 
of beef exporting countries in the Japanese market. The import patterns are clearly quite different 
by country, cut, and form, requiring an analysis that is more disaggregated than in previous 
studies. The estimated results indicate clearly that the highest markup of price over marginal cost 
belongs to U.S. frozen ribs, and this is the only indication of market power by U.S. exporters. 
The fact that most U.S. beef cuts to Japan have a very limited market in the U.S. is illustrated in 
this analysis. Because these cuts have a low value in the U.S. there is less room for U.S. 
exporters to price above marginal cost. 
Australia, with a very significant market share, and New Zealand, with a relatively small 
market share, both enjoy some degree of market power. Despite relying heavily on the Japanese 
market as an outlet for their products, exporters in Australia and New Zealand are able to take 
advantage of the low price and freshness of their products by capturing some small profits in 
exportation. The closer proximity of Australia and New Zealand to the Japanese market allows 
them to enjoy lower transportation costs and more rapid deliveries. This gives them an 
advantage, especially in the chilled beef market.  
Japanese consumers show strong preferences for freshness and these preferences 
contribute to a wider markup of prices for Australian and New Zealand exporters. These results 
are consistent with previous studies of Japanese meat market. A U.S Meat Export Federation 
survey found beef freshness was one of the most important product attributes to Japanese beef 
consumers. This survey showed Japanese meat consumers’ decision to purchase beef was 
strongly influenced by beef freshness, in contrast to price, product safety, and cleanliness (Kerr   14
et al. and Hayes). In another study, production date was found as a significant factor for Japanese 
steak consumers.  Increasing the importance of freshness, indicated by the date of expiration, by 
one unit increased the probability of buying steak by 6.27 percent (Erikson, et al.).  Australia and 
New Zealand can get beef into Japan with a longer shelf life, which puts U.S. and Canadian beef 
exporters at a clear disadvantage.  Transportation technology now allows the U.S. to ship chilled 
beef to Japan by sea, but shelf life relative to beef from Australia is still an issue. 
The results provide many insights into the behavior of beef exporters in the Japanese 
market. It is clear that exporting countries face downward-sloping residual demand functions for 
some of the chilled and frozen cuts, especially for Australia and New Zealand.  The U.S. and 
Canada, with large and small market shares, respectively, both behave competitively for most 
beef cuts. Out of the thirteen estimated residual inverse demand elasticities that were 
significantly different from zero, ten are associated with Australia and New Zealand (five for 
each country) and only three are associated with the U.S. and Canada. Australia, generally a non-
fed supplier, exports beef that has relatively low inverse demand elasticities. The demand faced 
by New Zealand exporters, another non-fed supplier, indicates successful niche marketing. 
Demand patterns are not substantially different between chilled and frozen or by cuts except for 
the U.S. frozen ribs. The own price inverse elasticity is larger in absolute value for U.S. frozen 
ribs, where the U.S. dominates, than any other beef type.  
American exporters generally seem to pay less attention to markup pricing over marginal 
costs than Australian exporters. This is understandable if the U.S. product does not have a high-
valued market in the U.S., but does in Japan.  In this case, the Japanese simply need to offer a 
price slightly above the beef’s use as trim in order to bid it away from the U.S. market. Unless 
Japanese buyers bid the product away from higher valued uses in the U.S., the Japanese hold all   15
the market power.  
The results have implications for advertising and promotion by beef exporting countries.  
Promotion efforts by Australia and New Zealand have clearly differentiated their product and 
generated market power for those exporters for certain beef cuts.  The U.S. and Canada don’t 
have such power except for beef ribs.  Other studies (Comaeu et al. and Le et al.) have found that 
advertising and promotion efforts for imported beef significantly strengthen Japanese demand for 
beef.  However, they studied aggregate beef exports and did not analyze the effects by beef cut 
or form.  The U.S. and Canada should consider increased promotional expenditures which 
address specific cuts, rather than generic beef, to enhance exports. 
There is definitely a need for further research in this area because of the new insights 
brought with this model. Different, more structured competitive behavior could be hypothesized 
and imposed with supply and demand relationships. This would provide more rigorous testing of 
specific hypotheses on pricing and reaction relationships. Another avenue might be to investigate 
the Japanese beef market hypothesizing imperfectly competitive buyers.  Japanese trading 
companies still dominate the import process – for instance, they have title to U.S. beef as it goes 
through customs. They might be extracting rents from export suppliers.  
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Footnote 
1 Treating countries as exporters is an abstraction from reality. We are forced to use country data 
to test the hypothesis of market power due to lack of firm level data.  In such cases, the estimated 
parameters may be interpreted as industry averages. 
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Table 1.  Japanese Beef Imports (in thousand metric tons), Fiscal Year 1999 (April 1 - March 
31) 
 
   Chilled   Frozen   Total  
 
Australia   192.1   121.5   314.1 
 
US    136.6   194.8   331.6 
 
Canada        3.9   14.5   18.4 
 
New  Zealand   3.5   10.4   14.0 
 
Total    336.2   345.2   682.6 
 
 
Table 2.  Share of Japanese Beef Import Market, Fiscal Year 1999, in Percentages 
 
   Chilled    Frozen    Total  
Australia     57.1        35.2      46.0 
 
US      40.6        56.4      48.6 
 
Canada         1.2          4.2         2.7 
 
New Zealand    1.0          3.0         2.0 
 
Total      49.2        50.8    100.0 
Table 3.  Japanese Imports of Boneless Beef Cuts (in metric tons) for the Period 1999:09- 
   2000:08    20
 
         U.S.    Australia  Canada  N Zealand  Total of 4 
Chilled Chucks
a    65,488   125,964     1,799      2,227   195,478 
 
Chilled Loins      25,837    37,807        641         575     64,860 
 
Chilled Ribs      51,549    33,199     2,540         598     87,886 
 
Frozen Chucks    26,744    20,155        530      3,442     50,871 
 
Frozen Loins      11,662      7,200        875      2,156     21,893 
 
Frozen Ribs    148,184    10,978   11,718      1,634   172,514 
 
Total      329,464  235,303   18,103    10,632    593,502 
 
 
a Chuck refers to chuck, clod, and round. 
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Table 4.  Estimated Residual Inverse Demand Elasticities in Japanese Beef Market
a  
               
               
    Australia  Canada  New Zealand  United States 
            
Chilled:          
            
Chuck
b   -0.1172  -0.0079  -0.1713
***   0.0108  
   (-0.2464)
c  (-0.2606) (-4.9198)    (0.2437)   
Loin   -0.1237
*  -0.1032
***  -0.2038
***   -0.0255  
   (-1.9938)  (-3.7836)  (-4.7572)    (-0.7299)   
Ribs   -0.0926
*  0.0227 -0.1562
***   0.0385  
   (-1.6018)  (0.0616)  (-3.9099)    (0.8632)   
Frozen:          
            
Chuck   -0.1151
***  -0.1951 -0.1485
***   -0.0416  
   (-3.724)  (-1.1051)  (-3.4598)    (-1.327)   
Loin   -1.0986
***  -0.0100 -0.2162    0.0130   
   (-4.1333)  (-0.1856)  (-1.3872)    (0.1049)   
Ribs   -0.1170
**  -0.1710
**  -0.1871
***   -0.3223
***   
   (-2.7298)  (-2.5275)  (-4.7376)    (-4.6250)   
 
Notes: 
a for the period 1992:02-2000:08 
b chuck refers to cuts from chuck, cold, and round 
c t-statistics are in parentheses 
*** significant at 1% level 
    
** significant at 5% level 
      
* significant at 10% level 
 
 